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1. Introduction  
The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) has widely come to be seen as an international norm (Bellamy, 
2015b:162), despite some scepticism over its normative foundations and operationalisation (Hehir, 
2017; Lechner, 2010). Since it was first mentioned in the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty’s report (ICISS, 2001), it has been officially endorsed as a new norm by states 
and regional organisations following the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) (UNGA, 
2005). The role of regional organisations in implementing R2P is particularly important, as evident 
from paragraph 139 of the WSOD which states that the UN Security Council (UNSC) should 
cooperate “with relevant regional organizations as appropriate” to take collective action when 
confronted with “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UNGA, 
2005:30). In the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while its member 
states formally approved R2P at the World Summit, subsequent debates demonstrated the 
organisation’s reluctance to fully support and implement it because of a normative conflict with its 
“ASEAN Way” norms, above all non-interference (Aruliah, 2011). 
However, Cyclone Nargis, which hit Myanmar in May 2008 and caused fatalities of over 140,000 
people (Junk, 2016:80), posed a serious challenge to ASEAN’s non-interference norm. The Myanmar 
military junta failed to provide the population with the necessary humanitarian aid, whereas UN 
agencies and international NGOs were denied access to the affected areas (Junk, 2016). Members of 
the international community began debating whether the unravelling crisis was a case for R2P, 
considering the junta’s opposition to receiving international aid a near-genocidal act (Junk, 2016:83). 
Despite eventually ruling out the applicability of R2P to natural disasters, the international debates 
also generated discussions over the norm within ASEAN. While contesting the applicability of R2P, 
ASEAN’s discourses and reaction to the crisis demonstrated a subtle change in its normative 
framework and an initial opening to the understanding of “sovereignty as responsibility” (Bellamy & 
Beeson, 2010; Tan, 2011). In fact, not only did ASEAN take an active role in coordinating relief 
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operations with the UN, but it also persuaded the Myanmar government to accept humanitarian aid 
(Junk, 2016), marking a clear, although subtle, departure from the non-interference that had 
characterised the organisation until then.  
Today a humanitarian crisis is unfolding along the border between Myanmar’s Rakhine State and 
Bangladesh, as over 693,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to escape persecution perpetrated by 
Myanmar’s military and ultranationalist groups (UNOCHA, 2018). Amnesty International (2017), 
Lowenstein (2015) and Fortify Rights & Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide (2017) 
have shown evidence of mass atrocity crimes, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. Despite these, the international community has its hands tied allegedly due to China 
and Russia’s threat of veto (Yap, 2017). The Myanmar government has defended its use of force by 
claiming that the Rohingyas are not legal citizens of Myanmar, but mere Bengali illegal immigrants 
coming to the country when it was still a province of British India (1824-1948), and that many are 
members of a terrorist group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) (Ibrahim, 
2016). In such circumstances and given the regional organisation’s active role during Nargis, the 
world has turned its attention to ASEAN. However, ASEAN has only coordinated some limited 
humanitarian efforts (Kurniawan, 2018), but has refrained from collectively condemning the atrocity 
crimes or persuading the Myanmar government to halt the violence. In contrast to the optimistic 
perception of ASEAN’s partial internalisation of R2P in its understanding of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” after Nargis and despite evidence of atrocity crimes, the organisation has not made 
concrete efforts to implement R2P in the Rohingya case (Southwick, 2015:148). These facts thus 
raise the following question:  
What explains ASEAN’s divergent reactions to Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis? 
This thesis argues that ASEAN’s contestation over R2P in the two cases explains why the 
organisation decided to intervene, albeit softly, in Myanmar’s handling of the humanitarian crisis 
caused by Cyclone Nargis, but is reluctant to do so in the Rohingya case. ASEAN’s stance on R2P 
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and intervention on humanitarian grounds has not been consistent and cannot be simply attributed to 
its adherence to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Building on the 
constructivist assumption that norms’ meaning is never static or pre-given, this thesis will rely upon 
the concept of “norm contestation”, which stems from the belief that norm diffusion and 
internalisation are not always linear or one-way, but an interactive process (Tholens and Groß 
2015:250); how an international norm is interpreted and contested by recipient actors has a decisive 
impact on its implementation in the local context. By relying on this theoretical framework, this thesis 
contends that ASEAN does not contest the validity of R2P, but its applicability to the single cases 
discussed, due to the nature of the crisis and the identity of the actors involved in the cases under 
study. Consequently, ASEAN’s applicatory contestation over R2P, based on these two aspects, 
determines the organisation’s implementation of the norm in the region, as well as its reaction to and 
degree of involvement in the crisis in question. In analysing ASEAN’s contestation over R2P between 
Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis, this thesis also demonstrates that ASEAN’s meaning-in-use 
of R2P covers legal citizens of member states only. This understanding is in alignment with ASEAN’s 
principle of national sovereignty, according to which the power to decide who are a state’s citizens 
rests with the state concerned. 
To answer the research question, this thesis will first review the literature concerning ASEAN’s 
stance on R2P in order to identify its limitation in explaining ASEAN’s inconsistent adherence to 
non-interference between Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis (section 2). Section 3 will present 
the theoretical framework, namely the constructivist theory of norm contestation. Section 4 will 
concern the research design and methodology; both “R2P contestation” and “ASEAN’s reaction” will 
be operationalised and the discursive frames will be explained. By employing discourse analysis, 
section 5 will examine ASEAN’s contestation over R2P in the two crises; how it justifies the 
inapplicability of the norm or on what grounds it disregards it; and, consequently, the reasons why 
the organisation was more prone to interfering in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis than in the 
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Rohingya case. Finally, after analysing ASEAN’s understanding of R2P (section 5.3), the thesis will 
draw the conclusions of the study, explore its relevance and implications for the study of norm 
contestation and other regional organisations, and suggest possible avenues for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review: Two Flaws in Norm Diffusion Theory  
The internalisation of R2P has been uneven across non-Western regional organisations. An actor is 
said to internalise a norm when the rationale for compliance shifts from a “logic of consequence” to 
a “logic of appropriateness” (Lantis, 2017:4). The African Union, the Economic Community of West 
African States and the League of Arab States have internalised R2P, although to different extents, as 
demonstrated by their understanding of “sovereignty as responsibility” (Barqueiro, et al., 2016:43; 
Carment, et al., 2016:339-340).  In contrast, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) and ASEAN are often singled out for their reluctance to internalise R2P because of the 
normative clash with their principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty (Carment, et al., 
2016:341). 
While regional organisations played a significant role in the Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali 
interventions (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Lee & Chan, 2016), ASEAN has largely remained silent 
on atrocity crimes committed within its region.  Most of the literature has explained this by focusing 
on the normative incompatibility between R2P and the “ASEAN Way” norms, which include not 
only national sovereignty and non-interference into member states’ domestic politics, but also 
decision-making by consensus, the resolution of disputes without the use or threat of force, and the 
principle of “regional solutions to regional problems” (Acharya, 2009:49; Bellamy & Drummond, 
2011:184). Kraft (2012:43) argues that “there is a fundamental discongruence between RtoP and 
ASEAN”, while Morada (2009:198) identifies the discrepancy between ASEAN member states’ 
disunified stance and the consensus principle as the main obstacle to the implementation of R2P in 
the region.  
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While still focusing on the issue of incompatibility of norms, other scholars hold a more optimistic 
view on the possibility of internalisation of R2P. Both Kassim (2014:62) and Sukma (2012:137) 
acknowledge the aforementioned difficulties of implementing R2P, but argue that ASEAN has the 
mechanisms of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, ASEAN Regional 
Forum, and ASEAN Political-Security Community to mainstream R2P into the organisation. A third 
strand of scholars even recognises Cyclone Nargis as a turning point in ASEAN’s internalisation 
and/or pre-localisation of the R2P norm. Tan (2011) and Bellamy & Beeson (2010) identify ASEAN’s 
active role in persuading Myanmar to accept humanitarian aid as a first, yet significant, sign of change 
in ASEAN’s normative framework. Similarly, Bellamy & Drummond (2011) argue that the non-
interference norm and R2P are undergoing a process of mutual accommodation, whereby both norms 
have been simultaneously revised and limited.  
The main flaw in the above literature is that it stems from the erroneous assumption that norm 
internalisation is necessarily a linear process, unaltered by the individual cases discussed, whereby 
an organisation takes ‘progressive’ steps to internalise an international norm over time. However, 
ASEAN’s reluctance to take an active role in dealing with the Rohingya crisis represents an apparent 
regression in the organisation’s process of norm internalisation and thus demonstrates that the latter 
does not necessarily follow a linear path, but is influenced by the discourse within the organisation.  
Furthermore, most of the above literature identifies the “ASEAN Way” norms as the main obstacle 
to the internalisation of R2P within ASEAN. Nonetheless, the fact that ASEAN’s adherence to 
national sovereignty and non-intervention has not been consistent, as evidenced by the case of 
Cyclone Nargis, demonstrates that the organisation’s implementation record of R2P cannot be 
explained solely as a result of a normative clash between R2P and the ASEAN Way. Therefore, an 
in-depth analysis of how the contestation over R2P has taken place within ASEAN from 2008 up to 
the present is needed to understand the organisation’s changing reactions to Cyclone Nargis and the 
Rohingya crisis. The following section will thus present the theoretical framework of the thesis and 
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identify which aspects of the two crises impact upon the organisation’s contestation over R2P and its 
subsequent reactions to the two events.  
 
3. Theoretical framework: Norm Contestation 
Finnemore & Sikkink’s theory (1998) cannot be used to fully explain ASEAN and other organisations 
that only partially internalise an external norm (Lantis, 2017:5). In fact, while focusing on the life-
cycle of norms – emergence, cascade, and internalisation – and arguing that norms “shape state 
behaviors and promote international cooperation” (Lantis, 2017:2), the life-cycle theory does not 
explicitly deal with ‘imperfect’ cases, where norms are not fully internalised. Consequently, to 
analyse ASEAN’s partial embrace of R2P, this thesis will rely upon the constructivist theory of norm 
contestation developed by, among others, Antje Wiener (2007; 2014). 
The concept of “norm contestation” can be defined as a disagreement over the validity of the norm, 
its meaning, the scope and the conditions under which the norm applies, or over its implementation 
(Hofmann, 2015:4; Wiener, 2007; 2014). This concept assumes that all norms are intersubjectively-
held social facts, have an inherently contested nature, thus their meaning-in-use is not fixed, but 
depends on how they are interpreted by local agents in the local context; and that contestation is 
necessary before a norm can be fully accepted (Wiener & Puetter, 2009:7). Consequently, this strand 
of the literature regards norms as social constructs and focuses on the intersubjective understanding 
of norms in the context of international relations (Wiener & Puetter, 2009:9). It thus lays greater 
emphasis on the processes whereby contestation between norm entrepreneurs and norm-takers occurs 
(Wiener, 2007; 2014).  
Norm contestation theorists can be divided into two categories: scholars who focus on the processes 
whereby norms are either resisted or “localised”, and those who instead examine the effects of 
contestation on the norm’s strength. Acharya (2004) develops a theoretical framework to explain the 
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dynamic process whereby external norms are “localised” in Southeast Asia, and thus actively 
constructed by local actors to make them fit with pre-existing local norms (Acharya, 2004:245). 
Localisation is an “evolutionary” and “progressive” process which “reshapes both existing beliefs 
and practices and foreign ideas in their local context” (Acharya, 2004:252). This process occurs when 
local norms are deep-rooted, as in the case of ASEAN, and it leads to institutional change regarding 
the tasks of an organisation and the means through which these are pursued (Acharya, 2004:252). 
Bloomfield (2017), in contrast, examines how “norm antipreneurs” resist R2P through discursive 
justifications and tactical opposition. 
In his later work on R2P, Acharya (2013) further develops his theory by introducing the concept of 
“norm circulation”, according to which, norm contestation at the local level can promote global 
discussions that help refine and strengthen the norm. Lantis (2017:7-8) also focuses on possible 
outcomes that may arise from the contestation of a norm: through non-compliance and disregard, a 
norm can simply be eroded and emptied of its purpose, while through active contestation, it can 
undergo positive change and be refined until it gains international legitimacy. Similarly, Deitelhoff 
& Zimmermann (2013) divide norm contestation into two categories, norm applicatory and 
justificatory discourses, and argue that they respectively strengthen and weaken norms. 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the literature of norm contestation, the aforementioned scholars 
fail to provide an adequate explanation for regional cases such as ASEAN’s shifting R2P stances on 
Myanmar, where the implementation of the norm by the same actor to the same target country has 
not been consistent and has varied from one case to another. Furthermore, the above studies have 
mainly focused on the effects that contestation has on the norm in itself, but have not examined how 
norm contestation determines the actions of a specific actor, such as ASEAN. Therefore, while 
sharing the constructivist assumption of norms as dynamic in nature and the role that contestation 
plays in shaping norms’ meaning, this thesis will go further and analyse the differences in ASEAN’s 
discourse on R2P between Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis to explain its divergent reactions 
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to these events. With this constructivist framework, this thesis examines on what grounds ASEAN 
has contested R2P, how the process of contestation has taken place, how a particular regional 
interpretation and meaning of R2P has been established, and how the contestation has impacted upon 
ASEAN’s implementation of the norm in the Myanmar crises.  
This study stresses ASEAN’s actorness and examines its discursive or communicative interactions. 
An actor is “an entity that is capable of […] formulating and acting upon decisions” and whose 
“capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and 
capabilities and external opportunities” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:33). ASEAN can thus be 
conceptualised as an actor not only because of its formal institutions, international recognition and 
shared identity and values (Mattheis & Wunderluch, 2017:725), but also because of its ability to 
formulate cohesive decisions and take collective action. 
Another key assumption that this study relies upon is the constructivist claim that norms are dynamic, 
as evidenced by R2P’s subtle change over time. The “Responsibility to Protect” stemmed from the 
UN’s failure to halt mass atrocity crimes in the 1990s (Deng, et al., 1996; Stahn, 2007:99). It is based 
on a dual conceptualisation of sovereignty, which entails the state’s responsibility to protect its people 
from violations of human rights, but also the international community’s responsibility to prevent and 
intervene when the state is unable or unwilling to do so (Stahn, 2007:103). Consequently, sovereignty 
is no longer treated as a right or prerogative, but also an obligation of the state towards its people 
(Stahn, 2007). Following Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998:891) conceptualisation of norm as a 
“standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”, R2P can be defined as an 
international norm because it has set a standard of appropriate behaviour for states, by redefining 
sovereignty as responsibility. However, being a “complex norm” with different prescriptions (Welsh, 
2013:384-386), R2P has evolved over time due to contestation regarding its meaning, 
operationalisation, and scope. For example, a key change in its scope is evident by comparing the 
ICISS report and the WSOD; while the former writes that states have the responsibility to protect 
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their “citizens” (ICISS, 2001:13), the scope is broadened in the WSOD (UNGA, 2005:30), where the 
protection is expanded to the “populations” (Gholiagha, 2015:1078). 
Following Deitelhoff & Zimmermann’s (2013) distinction between justificatory and applicatory 
frames, this thesis will analyse whether ASEAN contests the validity of R2P on the basis of the norm’s 
incompatibility with pre-existing local norms (justificatory discourses); or its application to the single 
cases because of the nature of the crisis (whether it is considered a mere natural disaster, or a near-
genocidal event; a refugee crisis as the legacy of the British colonial policy, a case of illegal migration 
and possible radicalisation, or an instance of mass atrocity crimes) and the identity and status of the 
actors involved (legal citizens of Myanmar, illegal immigrants, terrorists, or simply refugees). Hence, 
rather than focusing on how an international norm and norm entrepreneurs directly shape the 
behaviour of regional actors, this thesis contends that norm contestation at the regional/local level 
also determines how regional/local actors react.  
 
4. Methodology  
4.1 Case Selection 
To analyse ASEAN’s contestation over R2P and its impact on the organisation’s reaction to a 
humanitarian crisis, the thesis carries out a qualitative study that compares the cases of Cyclone 
Nargis (2008) and the current Rohingya crisis. Compared to other regional crises, these cases have 
been the most prominent ones in Southeast Asia regarding debates on R2P. The other major natural 
disaster in the region was the 2004 tsunami which, however, did not raise a debate on R2P as 
Indonesia accepted foreign assistance (Haacke, 2009:157). Discussions on R2P have also been briefly 
raised following the human rights violations perpetrated by Myanmar’s military junta, especially 
during the Saffron Revolution (2007) and against the Karen National Union, the Karenni National 
Progressive Party, and the Shan State Army-South (Haacke, 2009:176-177). However, although these 
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cases involve grave human rights violations, they do not amount to the four mass atrocity crimes to 
which R2P is applicable.  
Both the cases of Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis prompted an international debate on R2P 
and are thus comparable regarding ASEAN’s contestation of the norm. French Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner and several scholars (Barber, 2009; Haacke, 2009; Wong, 2009) argued that the 
military junta’s refusal to accept humanitarian aid after Nargis could be defined a “crime against 
humanity”, following Article 7 of the Rome Statute (ICC, 2002:4) which includes “other inhumane 
acts” within the definition of “crime against humanity”. In the Rohingya case, reports (Amnesty 
International, 2017; Fortify Rights & Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 2017; 
Lowenstein, 2015) have provided empirical evidence that the Rohingyas are facing genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity at the hand of the military and ultranationalist groups, while 
the Myanmar government is complicit in their persecution (Ibrahim, 2016).  
 
4.2 Discourse Analysis  
By defining “contestation” as “a social activity that involves discursive and critical engagement” 
(Wiener, 2014:2, emphasis in original), this study will rely upon discourse analysis. A discourse can 
be conceptualised as “the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, transformed and, 
accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality” (Holzscheiter, 2014:144). Consequently, this 
study will analyse how ASEAN has represented the two crises, made sense of the (in)applicability of 
R2P, and justified the organisation’s involvement in the case of Nargis and inaction in the Rohingya 
crisis. In so doing, the thesis will evaluate which discourse and “truth” regarding R2P and 
humanitarian catastrophes has prevailed within ASEAN during the two crises and in turn affected its 
decision to intervene or not. 
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In addition to ASEAN’s official documents and reports, the statements of Surin Pitsuwan (Secretary-
General in 2008) and Singapore’s leaders (Singapore held the Chairmanship both in 2008 and 2018) 
are representative of ASEAN’s collective discourse on R2P. The Secretary-General represents 
ASEAN and its views internationally (ASEAN, 2008a:Art.11), while the Chairman, which rotates 
annually, represents ASEAN with external partners, sets the annual “theme”, and is responsible for 
responding to “urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2008a:Art.32). In the 
case of Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia’s view, expressed at the UNSC, will also be included as it 
represented that of ASEAN (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010:272). In the Rohingya case instead, refugee-
hosting countries, namely Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, have been the most vocal in contesting 
the applicability of R2P but, since ASEAN’s official documents demonstrate that their view was 
shared by the organisation, some of their statements will be briefly mentioned in the analysis.  
 
4.3 Operationalisation  
By analysing the discourses within ASEAN, “contestation” will be operationalised according to the 
type, mode and frames used. As for the type, contestation discourses can be divided into justificatory 
ones, which relate to the validity of the norm, and applicatory ones, which instead refer to the 
(in)applicability of the norm to a specific situation (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2013). As for the 
modes, contestation can be either explicit when there is an open discussion and disapproval of the 
norm based on justificatory or applicatory discourses, or implicit when the norm is disregarded or 
neglected in the dominating discourse and agenda of the organisation (Wiener, 2014:2). Finally, 
following Deitelhoff & Zimmermann’s (2013) theoretical framework, several discursive frames may 
be found in ASEAN’s contestation over R2P: the norm’s incompatibility with pre-existing local 
norms (justificatory discourses), or its inapplicability based on the nature of the crisis, or the status 
and identity of the people involved in the crisis (applicatory discourses). By analysing ASEAN’s 
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contestation over R2P in the aforementioned cases, the thesis will attempt to explain which frames 
influenced the organisation’s reaction to each crisis.  
Following El Taraboulsi, et al. (2016) and Kuijt (2014), the reaction to a crisis is operationalised 
according to the organisation’s involvement in the resolution of the crisis in question, including when 
this means interfering in member states’ internal affairs, its provision of humanitarian assistance 
(monetary aid and primary necessities), and (non)indifference towards the needs of the victims.  
 
4.4 Data collection 
To carry out this research, this thesis examines both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
ones include: ASEAN’s communiqués and publications, Secretaries-General’s statements, Leaders’ 
views, and the AHA Centre’s publications (ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance on Disaster Management). Regional mass media – The Irrawaddy (Myanmar), The 
Nation, Bangkok Post (both from Thailand), New Strait Times (Malaysia), and principally The 
Jakarta Post (Indonesia) and The Straits Times (Singapore) – will also be analysed to better 
understand the regional discourse.1 Secondary sources comprise scholarly works and reports by the 
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and other interested think-tanks. 
 
5. The contestation over R2P & ASEAN’s response 
5.1 Cyclone Nargis 
When the invocation of R2P was debated at the UNSC, ASEAN explicitly and vocally contested the 
applicability of the norm to the case of Cyclone Nargis on various grounds. The first frame used by 
ASEAN to do so concerns the nature of the crisis. More specifically, its line of argument, also adopted 
                                                          
1 The working language of ASEAN and the above regional newspapers is English. 
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by China, claimed that R2P could not be applied to natural disasters (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010:272). 
At the UNSC on 14th May 2008, Indonesia, representing ASEAN, argued that “R2P was not intended 
to apply to natural disasters or to legitimize the forcible distribution of humanitarian assistance in 
such circumstances” (Bellamy & Davies, 2009:560). This view is in line with the WSOD (UNGA, 
2005:30), which only refers to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, 
while according to the ICISS report (2001:33), R2P can be invoked at times of “overwhelming natural 
or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call 
for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened”. 
According to ASEAN, applying R2P to a natural disaster would negatively impact upon Myanmar, 
the organisation, and the norm in itself. Indonesia declared that since R2P “is a very loaded term”, its 
application would render “the whole humanitarian effort […] politicised” (cited in Bellamy, et al., 
2009:27). This view was shared by ASEAN, as evident from the Chairman’s Statement of the Special 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, which affirmed that the humanitarian “assistance to Myanmar 
[…] should not be politicised” (ASEAN, 2008d). As Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo 
argued, forcing the delivery of humanitarian aid on Myanmar would only “make the situation worse 
and […] increase the suﬀering of the people in Myanmar” (cited in Haacke, 2009:172). ASEAN also 
believed that by expanding its scope, countries would become more sceptical about R2P, especially 
considering the West’s selective use of the norm (Junk 2016:87). It thus contended that applying R2P 
would “damage the principle itself” and “jeopardize […] future humanitarian situations” (cited in 
Bellamy & Davies, 2009:559-560).  
At the same time, ASEAN contested the application of R2P as it would allegedly lead to the direct 
involvement of the UN (or implicitly Western powers) in the crisis; during the UNSC discussion, 
Indonesia stated: “there are other better forums to discuss the humanitarian dimension of the 
Myanmar situation” (cited in Bellamy & Beeson, 2010:272). ASEAN shared this view as it believed 
that the intervention of the UN would erode its legitimacy as an organisation that can look after its 
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member states and its regional affairs; Surin Pitsuwan expressed the organisation’s concern: “it won’t 
work, and you are condemning ASEAN. You are giving ASEAN a kiss of death” (cited in Haacke, 
2009:173). Furthermore, the Myanmar government “was suspicious of [the] motives” behind the 
Western calls for invoking R2P in the aftermath of the crisis (George Yeo cited in ASEAN, 2010c:25; 
Barber, 2009:27-28). This was further aggravated by the presence of American and French warships 
off Myanmar’s coast (ASEAN, 2010c:25). Hence, despite contesting the application of R2P and 
intervention of the UN, ASEAN recognised that its involvement was needed to ensure that the 
external humanitarian relief programme would serve the ‘proper purpose’ of intervention and “would 
not be politicised” and morphed into an attempt of regime change (ASEAN, 2010c:39).  
ASEAN’s ambiguous contestation over R2P in the case of Nargis, contesting its applicability while 
recognising its responsibility to act, can also be attributed to its opposition to international 
interference in regional matters and fear of external intervention. The organisation was created not 
only to foster cooperation and peace but, in the context of the Cold War, also to prevent foreign 
interference (Pitsuwan, et al., 2014:18); one of its founding principles is, in fact, that of “regional 
solutions to regional problems” (Acharya, 2009:49). In the event of Nargis, ASEAN not only 
contested the applicability of R2P to the natural disaster, but also opposed the discussion of the issue 
at the UN. As Haacke (2009:183) contends, the possibility of a UN intervention through R2P 
prompted ASEAN to bridge between the international community and Myanmar.  
Despite contesting the applicability of R2P to a natural disaster because of its detrimental effects on 
the humanitarian situation in Myanmar, the organisation, and the norm in itself, and the alleged 
involvement of the UN, ASEAN’s discourse on Cyclone Nargis also demonstrated an initial opening 
to the R2P norm. ASEAN acknowledged that, as a regional organisation, it had a responsibility to 
alleviate the suffering of the victims of the cyclone because they were citizens of an ASEAN member 
state (Pitsuwan in ASEAN, 2010b:9; ASEAN, 2010b:68). Considering that “Myanmar was behaving 
irresponsibly”, ASEAN recognised that it had a responsibility to intervene in the humanitarian crisis 
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generated by the cyclone (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010: 275). In fact, Pitsuwan stated that “a new 
ASEAN [was] ready to take on responsibility” (Amador III, 2009:14) and “felt a collective 
responsibility to act” to prevent “a second wave of deaths from starvation or disease” (ASEAN, 
2010c:21-28). As Pitsuwan wrote, “ASEAN felt compelled, out of a sense of compassion, urgency 
and fraternity” to intervene (ASEAN, 2010a:9).  
ASEAN further showed sympathy for the disaster-hit population by taking an active role in the relief 
operations and demonstrating its “practical non-indifference” (Amador III, 2009:17). ASEAN held a 
dual role in the crisis: it coordinated the relief operations together with the UN and, in stark contrast 
to its non-interference norm, it also publicly expressed its disapproval of Myanmar’s behaviour and 
openly pressured the military junta to accept international aid (Amador III, 2009:4). In fact, at the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ special meeting on 19th May 2008, ASEAN collectively persuaded 
Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win to allow rescue teams to enter the country (Haacke, 
2009:173). Aware of Myanmar’s fear of foreign intervention, ASEAN presented Myanmar with three 
options: I) a UN-led relief mechanism; II) ASEAN’s coordination of the operations; III) the 
invocation of R2P and the forceful delivery of aid (Thuzar & Rieffel, 2018:6).  
Since Myanmar agreed to the second option as expected, ASEAN took on a leading role in 
coordinating the relief operations. It established the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster 
Assistance (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010:273) and deployed the Emergency Rapid Assessment Team 
(ERAT) (ASEAN, 2008b). Furthermore, it led an international Coalition of Mercy to gather 
international aid for Myanmar, including from the World Bank (ASEAN, 2008c), and created a 
Tripartite Core Group (TCG), chaired by the representatives of Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN, to 
coordinate the aid delivery (ASEAN, 2010a). Not only did ASEAN donate an unprecedented amount 
of monetary aid and primary necessities ($40,693,053), but it also deployed teams to investigate the 
situation and assist the country with the post-disaster rebuilding, recovery and capacity-building 
(ASEAN, 2010a:80).  
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Despite being criticised for its slowness in taking action, ASEAN had a crucial role in the aftermath 
of Nargis and demonstrated an “exceptional commitment” (Pitsuwan, 2011). According to Pitsuwan, 
ASEAN was “baptised” and proved that it can effectively respond to humanitarian crises (ASEAN, 
2010a:7). By implementing the non-coercive aspects of R2P, such as capacity-building, ASEAN 
“used R2P without even knowing it” (Morada 2013:261). Therefore, contesting the applicability of 
R2P to Nargis notwithstanding, ASEAN demonstrated an initial opening to the norm; not only did it 
acknowledge its responsibility to act and alleviate the suffering of the people, but it also actively 
pressured Myanmar to accept international aid, thus quietly disregarding its non-interference norm. 
Hence, ASEAN’s discourse on Cyclone Nargis demonstrates a shift from an absolute protection of 
national sovereignty and non-interference to the emergence of non-indifference. ASEAN further 
stated that its intervention had opened a “new course” aimed at “support[ing] both national and 
regional capacities to assist and protect citizens in times of disaster” (ASEAN, 2010b:68; emphasis 
added).  
 
5.2 The Rohingyas 
The frames that ASEAN uses to contest the applicability of R2P to the Rohingya crisis concern both 
the nature of the crisis, as in the case of Cyclone Nargis and, more crucially, the identity of the people 
involved. Contrary to Cyclone Nargis, in the Rohingya case, ASEAN has implicitly contested the 
applicability of R2P by disregarding the norm rather than by vocally objecting to it; the organisation 
has avoided to take responsibility for the protection of the Rohingyas on the grounds that they are 
mere illegal migrants and by downplaying the humanitarian crisis and mass atrocity crimes to an 
internal security issue.  
ASEAN has implicitly contested the applicability of R2P to the Rohingya crisis by neglecting the 
issue of the protection of the Rohingyas on its agenda. A key reason for this is that they are not 
considered legal citizens of an ASEAN member state (Iskandar, 2018). ASEAN, in fact, does not use 
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the word “Rohingya” in any of its official documents, which legitimises the Myanmar government’s 
claim that they are not legal citizens of the country (Frelick, 2017). It also opposed a Malaysian 
NGO’s choice of name as “ASEAN-Rohingya Center” to avoid being associated with the pro-
Rohingya group (Chongkittavorn & Robinson, 2017). Furthermore, it has refrained from denouncing 
Myanmar’s exclusion of these people from its citizenry and, although the Rohingyas are residing in 
an ASEAN member state, its agenda does not deal with the crisis from a protection perspective 
(McAuliffe, 2016:20).  
ASEAN further contests the applicability of R2P to the Rohingya crisis through the frame of “illegal 
migration”, where Rohingyas are considered mere “illegal migrants” rather than refugees and legal 
citizens of a member state. Since 2009, when the organisation first addressed the issue, the crisis has 
been downplayed to an illegal migration problem. The Chairman’s statement of the 14th ASEAN 
Summit (ASEAN, 2009), in fact, stated that the organisation discussed “the issue of illegal migrants 
in the Indian Ocean”. The same frame was further used in the Chairman’s Statement on the 
Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Concerning the Irregular 
Movement of Persons in Southeast Asia (2015:1-2), which refers to the crisis as a case of “irregular 
movement” and “irregular migration”.  
Since 2016, only Malaysia has criticised ASEAN’s inaction and called the Rohingya crisis a 
“genocide” (Ha & Htut, 2016). Nonetheless, this dissenting stance has been triggered by domestic 
pro-Rohingya protests and by then Prime Minister Najib Razak’s need to raise support in view of a 
forthcoming general election, especially following the 1MDB scandal (Ha & Htut, 2016:3). Despite 
Malaysia’s recent dissent, the “irregular migrant” frame is indicative of how ASEAN contests the 
applicability of R2P to the Rohingya crisis. While “irregular migration” signifies the “entry, stay or 
work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration 
regulations”, the term “refugee” refers to someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, 
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is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country” (IOM, 2011; UNHCR, 1951). Therefore, by calling them 
“illegal migrants” rather than “refugees”, ASEAN does not acknowledge that the Rohingyas are 
escaping atrocity crimes and, consequently, that R2P is applicable.  
Through this frame of “illegal migration”, ASEAN contests the applicability of R2P by disregarding 
the norm. More specifically, according to the UN Secretary-General’s report Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect (2009), a key step to implementing R2P is the protection of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This is further supported by scholars, including Orchard 
(2016), Bellamy (2013), Barbour & Gorlick (2008), and Gilgan (2017), who contend that refugee 
protection is closely linked to R2P, as refugees and IDPs can be a first sign that mass atrocities are 
taking place and forced displacement itself, as a result of ethnic cleansing, is a mass atrocity crime. 
Gilgan (2017:375) further demonstrates the link between refugee protection and R2P by claiming that 
the “other peaceful means” that can be used by the international community to protect populations 
(Pillar III of the WSOD) include refugee protection and asylum, as suggested also by the working 
group of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the Secretariat’s Executive 
Committee on Peace and Security, who identified these measures among the non-coercive ones under 
Pillar III (Bellamy, 2013:157). Nonetheless, ASEAN has neglected these issues on its agenda through 
the frame of “illegal migration”. 
The second frame used by ASEAN to implicitly contest the applicability of R2P is “human trafficking 
and smuggling”. At the 2009 ASEAN Summit, which referred to the Rohingyas as “illegal migrants”, 
the organisation agreed to deal with the issue at the Bali Process in the same year (IRIN, 2013). 
However, the latter is an international forum merely concerned with “smuggling, trafficking in 
persons and related transnational crime” rather than atrocity crimes (The Bali Process, s.d.). In 
addition to referring to illegal migration, the 2015 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting discussed “the 
Connection between Irregular Movement of Persons with Human Trafficking and People Smuggling” 
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(ASEAN, 2015:1). Furthermore, while this meeting triggered the creation of the ASEAN Convention 
Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Ha & Htut, 2016:5), it did not 
mention that human trafficking is only a secondary problem that some Rohingyas are facing, but the 
root cause is their persecution in Myanmar. ASEAN has thus contested the applicability of R2P by 
downplaying the Rohingya crisis not only to a case of irregular/illegal migration, but also of human 
trafficking and smuggling, to which R2P does not apply.  
A third and more recent frame to contest the applicability of R2P is that of “possible radicalisation”. 
For Singapore, a top priority of its 2018 Chairmanship is counter-terrorism as there is widespread 
fear that Rakhine “becomes another sanctuary, another hotbed, for extremism and terrorism” (cited 
in Thuzar & Rieffel, 2018:7). Recent ASEAN documents echo this common concern; on 8th February 
2018, ASEAN (2018a:1) published a joint statement of Defence Ministers, expressing “great concern 
[for] the rise of terrorism in [the] region”. Furthermore, despite claiming that the humanitarian crisis 
in Rakhine was “comprehensively discussed”, the Sydney Declaration of the ASEAN-Australia 
Summit (March 2018) does not directly mention the Rohingya crisis but deals with counter-terrorism 
measures (ASEAN-Australia, 2018; Yahya, 2018). This view is also common among regional 
newspapers, such as The Straits Times, which has extensively reported on Rohingyas’ links with 
Islamist extremism (Arshad, 2017), despite contrary evidence that ARSA does not have any 
transnational connections (Khan, 2017). In this way, ASEAN implicitly contests the applicability of 
R2P as it does not acknowledge the primary issue of the crisis: mass atrocity crimes.  
The above frames used by ASEAN to contest the applicability of R2P have determined its reaction 
to the crisis; besides offering limited humanitarian aid, the organisation’s efforts have been mainly 
directed at tackling human trafficking and countering terrorism. Dealing with the issue from a national 
security perspective without acknowledging the atrocity crimes, ASEAN has refrained from actively 
pressuring the Myanmar government to halt the violence; this stands in stark contrast to its 
pressurising approach after Cyclone Nargis. ASEAN’s lenient attitude towards Myanmar is evident 
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from recent statements; ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Rakhine 
(2017:1) “condemned the attacks against Myanmar security forces on 25 August 2017”2 by ARSA, 
but ASEAN expressed little sympathy towards the Rohingya population after the 2012 riots3, simply 
stating that it was “following closely recent developments in the Rakhine State” (ASEAN, 2012:1).  
In the Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat (ASEAN, 2018b:3), the 
organisation “expressed [its] continued support for Myanmar’s humanitarian relief programme in 
Rakhine State”. Nonetheless, the humanitarian efforts have been limited in comparison to Cyclone 
Nargis; ASEAN, through the AHA Centre, has neither coordinated a united relief operation nor 
created a Tripartite Core Group with the international community as it did after Nargis. Furthermore, 
it did not offer aid to the Rohingyas until 2017, and the aid has been minimal (80 tonnes of relief 
items and $100,000) (AHA Centre, 2018), compared to $40,693,053 after Nargis (ASEAN, 
2010a:80).  
The organisation has further demonstrated its indifference towards the plight of the Rohingyas by 
refraining from providing asylum to these people; by using the “illegal migrants” frame, ASEAN has 
avoided responsibility for the protection of the Rohingyas by not treating them as refugees escaping 
mass atrocity crimes. Instead, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have been pushing back Rohingyas 
coming to their shores, causing further suffering to these people (Moretti, 2018). Their stance is 
shared by ASEAN as a whole, empowering its actorness; as mentioned above, with a narrow focus 
on human trafficking, following the Bali Process and the 2015 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
ASEAN’s efforts have been directed at the prosecution of migration brokers, providing its own 
representation of the ‘truth’ of the crisis (Oh, 2015:1). ASEAN’s priority at the 2015 Ministerial 
Meeting was in fact “finding a solution to the crisis of influx of irregular migrants and its serious 
                                                          
2 ARSA’s attack on 30 security force outposts (25 August 2017) was taken as a pretext by the Myanmar Army to 
systematically kill the Rohingyas (Amnesty International, 2017:6). 
 
3 Systematic violence aimed at displacing the Rohingyas broke out in 2012 after Rohingyas allegedly raped and 
murdered Thida Htwe, a Buddhist Rakhine woman (Ibrahim, 2016:81). 
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impact on the national security of the affected countries” rather than addressing its root causes 
(Kneebone, 2016:161).  
Despite UN claims that their return is not safe (Slodkowski, 2018), ASEAN has publicly expressed 
its support for the repatriation of the Rohingyas (ASEAN, 2018b). This is possibly due to the 
receiving countries’ vocal opposition to hosting the Rohingyas, who are perceived not only as a threat 
to national security for their alleged links to Islamist extremism, but also as a source of economic and 
social instability (Neuman, 2015). Thai PM Prayuth Chan-ocha stated: “Where will the budget [to 
assist them] come from? That money will need to come from Thai people’s taxes, right?”, while 
Indonesian Military Chief Moeldoko declared: “We will try to prevent them from entering our 
territory, otherwise it will create social issues” (Neuman, 2015). This further demonstrates the 
influence of receiving countries on ASEAN’s discourse.  
Finally, as a result of the “possible radicalisation” frame, ASEAN has reacted to the Rohingya crisis 
by strengthening its cooperation on counter-terrorism measures, rather than acting on the atrocity 
crimes. Considering the possible threat coming from Rakhine, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian 
Balakrishnan affirmed ASEAN’s intra-cooperation to tackle this transnational threat (Thuzar & 
Rieffel, 2018:7). Furthermore, following the Joint Statement by the ASEAN Defence Ministers on 
Countering Terrorism in ASEAN (2018a), the intelligence-sharing initiative “Our Eyes” has been 
launched to improve cooperation against the threat of Islamist extremism (Allard, 2018). Hence, 
ASEAN’s implicit contestation over R2P has determined its minimal involvement and reaction to the 
Rohingya crisis, which has been directed at tackling the security aspect of the issue.  
 
5.3 ASEAN’s meaning-in-use of R2P 
In analysing the cases of Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingyas, the above sections have demonstrated 
that ASEAN’s contestation over R2P, and the discursive frames used to do so, have influenced the 
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organisation’s reaction to the humanitarian crises, its degree of involvement, through the coordination 
of humanitarian aid and efforts to pressure the Myanmar government, and its (non)indifference 
towards the victims. This indicates that not only norms in themselves, but also their contestation 
shapes actors’ behaviour and their implementation of the norm in the regional context.  
According to the above discourse analysis, ASEAN has contested R2P in the cases of Cyclone Nargis 
and the Rohingya crisis in two different modes. As explained in section 4.3, Wiener (2014:2) 
differentiates between explicit and implicit contestation; in the case of Nargis, ASEAN explicitly 
contested R2P by directly referring to the norm during its discussions, while in the Rohingya case, it 
has implicitly contested it by disregarding it and avoiding its responsibility to assist the refugees. As 
for type of contestation, following Deitelhoff & Zimmermann’s (2013) distinction between 
applicatory and justificatory discourses of norm contestation (section 3), this thesis shows that, 
contrary to what the existing literature contends, in the cases of Nargis and the Rohingyas (sections 
5.1 and 5.2), ASEAN has not contested the validity of R2P, but its applicability to the individual cases 
in question. In fact, there is no evidence that ASEAN has contested the norm as such, but contended 
that, due to specific characteristics of the crises, R2P could not be applied. The applicatory 
contestation over R2P in the two cases has, however, produced two different outcomes. The explicit 
contestation of the norm to the case of Cyclone Nargis has generated international discussions, which 
have refined the norm as non-applicable to natural disasters (Junk, 20116:92). On the other hand, in 
the Rohingya case, the implicit contestation over R2P is affecting its implementation and, possibly, 
its strength in the region.  
The above findings also demonstrate that ASEAN’s meaning-in-use of R2P has been shaped by the 
organisation’s contestation of the norm in the cases under discussion. R2P is applicable to protect 
“legal citizens” of Southeast Asian countries rather than the entire population residing in the region, 
as evidenced by ASEAN’s reluctance to protect the Rohingyas, who are not officially citizens of 
Myanmar and de facto stateless, but its protection of Myanmar’s citizens after Cyclone Nargis. 
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However, this interpretation of R2P is not in line with the latest developments of the norm; while in 
its initial conceptualisation in the ICISS report (2001:13), R2P was referred to “citizens” of states, 
the WSOD (UNGA, 2005:30; emphasis added) declares that states and the international community 
have the “responsibility to protect populations” from mass atrocity crimes. Even the Secretary-
General’s report (2009:8; emphasis added) affirms that the State has the responsibility “to protect its 
populations, whether nationals or not”. Bellamy (2015a:228) explains that the WSOD intentionally 
referred to “populations” rather than “citizens” to include “stateless groups, refugees and other non-
citizens”. Hence, despite being stateless and non-citizens of Myanmar, Rohingyas are, at least in 
theory, under the responsibility of Myanmar and that of the international community once the state is 
“manifestly failing” to protect them (UNGA, 2005:30).  
ASEAN’s interpretation of R2P as inclusive only of legal citizens can be attributed to the anti-colonial 
sentiments inherent in the organisation since its founding. Apart from Thailand, all Southeast Asian 
countries experienced colonialism so, in addition to the fear of foreign interference, ASEAN’s 
intersubjective systemic structures are also built upon the region’s attempt to rid itself of its colonial 
past (Manea, 2008). Being the legacy of British colonialism, the Rohingyas are not considered legal 
citizens of Myanmar and, consequently, not under the responsibility of ASEAN (Iskandar, 2018). 
ASEAN has, in fact, been largely inactive in the resolution of the crisis and has left “protection-
related assistance” for the refugees to be managed by the international community (McAuliffe, 
2016:20). Hence, in stark contrast to its opposition to the international community’s interference in 
the case of Nargis, ASEAN has rejected its responsibility to protect the Rohingyas and has passed the 
responsibility on to the international community since the Rohingyas are not legal citizens of 
Myanmar, but the mere product of British colonialism.  
The above findings are also indicative of ASEAN’s process of internalisation of R2P. In its response 
to Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN demonstrated an initial opening to R2P, leading Bellamy & Beeson 
(2010), Tan (2011) and Bellamy & Drummond (2011) to contend that it was on the way to localising 
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or accommodating the norm. However, ASEAN’s reluctance to protect the Rohingyas indicates that 
the organisation has established a narrow meaning-in-use of R2P which restricts to the protection of 
legal citizens of ASEAN member states, rather than populations. Although the Rohingya case 
represents an apparent regression in ASEAN’s stance on R2P, ASEAN’s narrow meaning-in-use of 
R2P indicates that the norm has been localised to preserve the organisation’s indigenous norms of 
national sovereignty and non-interference; ASEAN recognises that it has a responsibility to protect 
citizens, but determining who is granted citizenship status is the prerogative of states and a matter of 
national sovereignty. In the words of Pitsuwan, “If a government says these people are not citizens, 
it is not for the ASEAN to say change your laws, change your constitution and accept these people” 
(Hindstrom, 2012). In ASEAN’s view, R2P is a normatively valid norm, but is applicable only to 
cases that involve legal citizens of a member state. Hence, following Acharya’s (2004) theory of 
localisation (section 3), ASEAN has not rejected R2P or accepted it wholesale by completely ignoring 
its indigenous norms, but the process has been two-way; ASEAN has reshaped both the R2P norm, 
by narrowing its applicability, and its own norms, by allowing greater interference in the internal 
affairs of member states. Consequently, through the localisation of R2P, ASEAN has expanded its 
tasks, which now include the protection of citizens of ASEAN members. 
 
6. Conclusion  
ASEAN’s divergent reactions to the humanitarian crises caused by Cyclone Nargis and the 
persecution of the Rohingyas, its active involvement in the first one and indifference in the latter 
despite the mass atrocity crimes reported, motivated this thesis to investigate the reasons behind 
ASEAN’s behaviour. After reviewing the literature on ASEAN’s stance on R2P, this thesis 
demonstrated its limitations in explaining the organisation’s inconsistent adherence to non-
interference between Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis. Hence, this study argued that, contrary 
to the existing literature, ASEAN’s reaction to humanitarian crises does not entirely draw on its 
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ASEAN Way norms, such as non-interference, but also on how the organisation has contested R2P 
in the cases in question, namely Cyclone Nargis and the Rohingya crisis.  
This study relied upon the constructivist theory of norm contestation to examine the discursive frames 
used by ASEAN to contest R2P in the two crises. According to the findings, these refer to the nature 
of the crisis and the identity of the actors involved, rather than its ASEAN Way norms. In the case of 
Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN argued that R2P could not be applied to a natural disaster, but the 
organisation, rather than the UN, had to take responsibility for the humanitarian crisis. In the 
Rohingya case instead, ASEAN has refrained from taking responsibility, thus contesting the 
applicability of R2P by disregarding it and downplaying the crisis to an illegal migration, human 
trafficking and possible radicalisation case, and depicting the Rohingyas as illegal migrants rather 
than refugees. The responsibility instead would rest with the broader international community. These 
specific aspects of the two events, rather than the organisation’s blanket support for non-interference, 
have influenced ASEAN’s reaction to and degree of involvement in the crises.  
Although this study is limited to the specific case of ASEAN, thus prioritising internal over external 
validity, the argument that R2P contestation influences an organisation’s reaction to a humanitarian 
crisis can also be generalisable to other regional organisations. In the case of Darfur, the African 
Union initially contested the applicability of R2P claiming that it was only a civil conflict not 
mounting to crimes against humanity (Verhoeven, et al., 2016:24), while SAARC rejected any major 
role in the Sri Lankan civil war (1983-2009) (Carment, et al., 2016:341).  
Furthermore, by analysing ASEAN’s different contestation over R2P during Cyclone Nargis and the 
Rohingya crisis, this thesis demonstrated that the organisation has localised the R2P norm by limiting 
its applicability to citizens rather than populations. Future research is needed to compare processes 
of R2P internalisation across different regional organisations, especially non-Western ones, to 
analyse those that follow the same path as ASEAN or differ from it.  
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Moreover, this study demonstrated that, in both cases, ASEAN contested the applicability of R2P 
rather than the validity of the norm in itself, but the meaning-in-use established comprises only legal 
citizens of ASEAN countries rather than “populations”. Deitelhoff & Zimmermann (2013) argue that 
justificatory discourses lead to non-compliance and norm decay, while applicatory ones may 
strengthen the norm. However, this thesis takes issue with this claim; while ASEAN’s applicatory 
contestation over R2P on Cyclone Nargis contributed to refining the scope of the norm, its 
contestation over R2P on applicatory grounds in the Rohingya case indicates a narrow understanding 
of the norm, which threatens its implementation and strength in the region. Consequently, this study 
offers a starting point for future research on how applicatory contestation impacts upon the strength 
of R2P in Southeast Asia.  
To conclude, not only does the failure to protect the Rohingyas possibly affect the strength of R2P 
within the region, but also has implications for ASEAN’s legitimacy and community-building project 
to create a people-oriented community (Lego, 2017). Furthermore, ASEAN’s tolerant stance towards 
Myanmar, ignoring the mass atrocities committed by its army against the Rohingyas, has implications 
for the country’s democratisation. In line with Davies’s (2017:175) theory of regional organisations 
as “regimes of bounded toleration”, ASEAN’s behaviour is strengthening Myanmar’s “defective 
democracy” rather than encouraging its full democratisation. Hence, this study serves as a call for 
ASEAN to find a regional solution to the problem of the Rohingyas and assume an active role in 
pressuring the Myanmar government, for example by outlining the possible consequences of 
Myanmar’s behaviour, as it did in the aftermath of Nargis. Furthermore, following the efforts it 
undertook after Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s recent call for assistance (Doherty, 2018), ASEAN 
should re-establish a Tripartite Core Group with the UN as a first step towards alleviating the suffering 
of the Rohingyas. It is only by actively and critically engaging with Myanmar that ASEAN can fulfil 
the very reason for which it was created: ensuring regional peace and security. 
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